Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

State of Utah v. Bradley C. Davis and Holly H.
Hyatt : Response to Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Thomas B. Brunker; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Attorney for
Appellee.
D. Bruce Oliver; D. Bruce Oliver, P.C.; Attorney for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Rehearing, Utah v. Davis, No. 960271 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/199

This Response to Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

mnm

UTAH
MENT
.A j 0

DOCKET NO. ^?(aA?

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
000O000

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 960271-CA
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Priority No. 2

vs.
BRADLEY C. DAVIS and
HOLLY H. HYATT,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
-oOo-

Thomas B. Brunker (4804)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

D. Bruce Oliver (5120)
D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C.
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Attorney for Appellants

FILED
Utah Court of Aooeals

OCT 1 9 m%
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

Date
Case No
UTAH SUPREME COURT/UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CHECKLIST FOR BRIEFS
\S
ZJZT

L^

s
^

*
~y^

y

_^
v
-Jk£/_

CHECK TO SEE THAT THE RECORD HAS BEEN RETURNED
TIMELY FILING OF BRIEF /JD^^CA &*> *f\ /0//*f
{<?<$("Ffi^/HrL&
An untimely brief may be rejected^under Rule zJ{d). If a brief is untimely, a
motion under Rule 26 will be mandatory for permission tofilea late brief.
CORRECT NUMBER OF COPIES
1. Supreme Court: lOj^ogiw, one containing original signature
2. Court of Appeals: 8 copies)sone containing original signature
3. Petition for Rehearing: 7 copies, one containing original signature
LENGTH
(Excluding Addendum)
1.
Appellant/Appellee: 50 pages
3. Petition Rehearing: 15 pages
2.
Reply:
25 pages
4. Araicus/Intervenor 50 pages
SIZE AND BINDING
PRINTING REQUIREMENTS
1.
Proportionally spaced typeface must be 13-point or larger for both text
and footnotes; monospaced typeface may not contain more than 10
characters per inch.
2.
Print on both sides of the page.
3.
Double-spaced; 1 % spacing is unacceptable.
4.
l w margin on all sides
COVER REQUIREMENTS
1.
Color:
Appellant or Petitioner: Blue
Amicus, Intervener, GuardiaiuGreen
Appellee or RcspondcnfcRed
Petition for Rehearing:
Tan
Reply:
Gray
Response to (JRehearing:
White
2.
Name of counsel and parties represented.
3.
Argument priority classification. (R«29) (Appellee)
CONTENT REQUIREMENTS - IN ORDER STATED
List of all Parties.
Table of Contents with page references.
Table of Authorities.
/jlJUO
Jurisdictional Statement. (Mandatory for Appellant)
„
Statement of Issues & Standard of Review (Mandatory for Appellant) L/T^ A.
Citation to record showing issue preserved in trial court; OR
fflyL
B.
Statement of grounds for seeking review of issue not preserved in trial court^
Constitutional or statutory provisions.
hA^
Statement of Case. (Mandatory for Appellant)
Aft (r^ ^ A
Statement of Facts.
j/yl @uJ^
Summary of Argument.
'
Argument.
Conclusion.
Signature of counsel of record or party if pro se.
Proof of Service.
Addendum: Findings of fact; memorandum decision; fmal order; Court of Appeals
opinion when petition for certiorari is granted. (Mandatory for Appellant)

a BRUCE OLIVER, P.C,
ATTORNEY AT LAW

WESTGATE BUSINESS CENTER
160 SOUTH 300 WEST\ SUITE 210
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 * 1 Ol - !40O

October 19, 1998

Julie D'Alesandro
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
450 South State
P.O, Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
Re:

AREA CODE (801)
328-8888
299-1700
S46-1SOO
865-9200
FAX595-0300

Facsimile Transmission
(801) 578-3999
Pages: 8

State v. Davis, 970271-CA

Dear Julie:
The following is a lodged copy of the Response to Petition for Rehearing, The haid-copies
have been placed in the U.S. Mail and should be delivered tomorrow.
If there are any questions or concerns, please feel free to call. Thank you for your assistance
in this matter.
Sincerely,
D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C.

o^_
D. Bruce Oliver
DBO:jkj

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL COPIES OR THE COPIES ARE NOT READABLE, PLEASE CALL IMMEDIATELY,
Trie information catained in this telefacsimile message is transmitted by an attorney It is privileged and confidential, intended only for the use of
the ittlividtiAl at entity named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended facspteni, you are hereby notified thM any dissemination*
distribution or copy of u\e communication is strictly prohibited. If this communication has been received in enw, please immediately notify u$ by
telcphonef collect if necessary, and return the original message to us at the above address via the U.S, Poswl Service (wc will reimburse poatafe)
Thank you.

D.Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
oooOooo

STATE OF UTAH,

(
)

Plaintiff and Appellee,

(

vs.

(

BRADLEY C. DAVIS and
HOLLY H. HYATT,

(

Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONSE TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Case No. 960271-CA

)

Priority No. 2

)

Appellant Davis was on probation for a misdemeanor theft in Kane
County; Appellant Hyatt was not on probation, nor had she been suspect of illegal
conduct. Because an officer, one night, witnesses Appellant Davis run into a man at a
truck stop, who the day earlier was arrested for possession of a drug paraphernalia, the
appellant's probation officer and other agents conducted a search of the couples' home
and vehicles. The agents lacked a reasonable facts to suspect mat the appellants' were
committing a public offense. Nonetheless, the agents do find small amounts of drugs
and the appellants were subsequently charged with possession with intent to distribute.

POINT I.
THE APPELLATE COURTS ARE FREE TO RULE ON QUESTIONS OF LAW ON
DE NOVO.
In this matter, the appellant claims a violation of due process. The State
believes, mistakenly so, that it was deprived of the opportunity to respond to the issue
of "common authority or control." The State failed to adequately address the issue of
the Davis' control over Hyatt's vehicle. The appellants adequately addressed the issue
absent controlling Utah jurisprudence on the issue to brief more clearly than as
presented by the appellants. Nonetheless, this Court's majority opinion was correct
when it determined that the appellants had adequately raised and preserved the issue,
Just as the Court pointed out, the appellants argued the matter in the trial court,
addressed it in their brief, and argued it again at oral arguments.
The fact that this Court included persuasive authority from other
jurisdictions, when the appellants had not was not an abusive of discretion on questions
of law. These issues were and are reviewable de novo and no particular deference is
accorded to the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of law, however, the
standard of review is not phrased as "clearly erroneous." Rather, appellate
review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the
term "correctness," Controlling Utah case law teaches that "correctness"
means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d
431, 433 (Utah 1993); see, Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d
1381, 1383 (Utah 19.93). This is because appellate courts have traditionally been
seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is
uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful
2

Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751, 779 (1957); see,
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1266. In other words, one can visualize the traditional
standard-of-review scheme as a continuum of deference anchored at either end
by die clearly erroneous and correction-of-error standards, which correspond
with whether the issue is characterized as one of fact or of law.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (1994). (Emphasis added). The Court is not limited in its
review of the issue presented in this matter. It is within the discretion of the Court to
address and review the facts of the case in light of existing case law, both precedent
and persuasive authority to develop Utah jurisprudence as the appellate court's deem
necessary and appropriate.
As the Utah State Supreme Court has stated:
In Utah, the supreme court has, in addition to common law power,
constitutional authority to manage the appellate process, Utah Const, art.
V, § 1, art. VIII, §§ 1, 4, as well as inherent supervisory authority over
all courts of this State. Ejx., State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7
(Nov. 30, 1992); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 290 (Utah 1989)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State
v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989); State v. James, 767 P,2d 549,
557 (Utah 1989); In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 653 (Utah
1988); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result); In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah
1985). Unless constrained by a constitutional or statutory provision, we
exercise our powers to fashion standards of review that we think best
allocate responsibility between appellate and trial courts in light of the
particular determination under review. Based on the foregoing, we
conclude that the allocation of responsibility, or discretion, between trial
and appellate courts is a matter of peculiar and close importance to the
courts in question, and we see no reason why our authority to define
standards of review should not extend to cases where the determination
under review is a question of federal law.
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). The Thurman Court went on to
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explain, in pertinent part:
It is widely agreed that the primary function of a standard of review is to
apportion power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and
appellate courts for determining an issue or class of issues. See, e.g.,
State v. Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 38 (Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1992)
(Jackson, J,, concurring); Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 36 (D.C
1989); Paul D. Carrington et aL, Justice on Appeal 130 (1976); Patrick
W. Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 Def. L.J. 377, 377
(1984); Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review - Looking Beyond the
Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1991) [hereinafter Hofer]; Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 234-35
(1985) [hereinafter Monaghan]. Put another way, a standard of review
allocates discretion between trial and appellate courts. In determining the
appropriateness of a particular allocation of responsibility for deciding an
issue or class of issues, account should be taken of the relative capabilities
of each level of the court system to take evidence and makefindingsof
fact in the face of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and to set
binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other. See, e ^ , Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1985); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d
125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d213,
217-18 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195,
1201-02 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Davis,
564 A.2d at 36-37, In short, the choice of the appropriate standard of
review "turns on a determination that, as a matter of the sound
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than
another to decide the issue in question." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552, 559-60 (1988) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114); accord Salve
Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1222 (1991). See generally
Hofer at 237-41.
Id. In other words, the Utah Supreme Court absent an expressed Federal Law limiting
the appellate courts' power are free to govern themselves and rule of Utah matters free
and clear of out-of-state influences. In this matter, this Court acted clearly within this
discretion.
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As for the State's argument, the State relies on the 1992 holding of State
v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). In Brown, the Utah Supreme Court refused to
reach a state constitutional issue that Brown raised for the first time in his reply brief,
holding:
If we were to review Brown's state constitutional analysis under those
circumstances, he would be rewarded for his omission and given the opportunity
to present an unopposed analysis. The State would be placed in the difficult
position in future cases of either missing the opportunity to brief the state
constitutional law issue or having to construct and then rebut the unbriefed issue.
Id. However, what the State fails to explain is that the facts in Brown are
distinguishable from the facts in this case. The Brown Court noted in footnote 1:
In his opening brief, Brown stated that seizure of his clothes and folding knife
"should have been suppressed under either the state or federal constitutions."
The State correctly noted that Brown's analysis of the search and seizure issue
proceeded under Fourth Amendment law with no effort to analyze the question
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The State responded,
therefore, by discussing only federal law. The State cites State v. Lafferty, 749
P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), affd, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989), vacated on
other grounds sub nom, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F,2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991),
where we stated the general rule that "we will not engage in a state constitutional
analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state and federal
constitutions is briefed."
In his response brief, Brown obviously realized his failure to include a state
constitutional analysis and asserted this entirely new argument. If we were to
review Brown's state constitutional analysis under those circumstances, he would
be rewarded for his omission and given the opportunity to present an unopposed
analysis. The State would be placed in the difficult position in future cases of
either missing the opportunity to brief the state constitutional law issue or having
to construct and then rebut the unbriefed issue. We prefer to review state
constitutional law issues that both parties have had an opportunity to brief.
Brown was aware that a state constitutional law claim might be useful to him
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when filing his opening brief. Because he did not analyze that issue at that time,
we will not review it.
Id. Unlike the circumstance in Brown, the appellants in this matter have not attempted
to rehabilitate an appeal where they have realized that they failed to include any such
state constitutional analysis. However, as pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court, this
is not an absolute, rather it is a discretionary power. The Court in Romrell v. Zions
First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (1980) previously ruled on this issue stating:
For the first time, defendants raise the issue of the trial court's failure to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law in their reply brief. As a general rule, an
issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on appeal since a
reply brief, as stated in Rule 75(p)(2)i "shall be limited to answering any new
matter set forth in respondent's brief . . . ." Nevertheless, the Court, in its
discretion, may decide a case upon any points that its proper disposition may
require, even if first raised in a reply brief,
Id. (Citations omitted, emphasis added). Clearly it is within this Court's discretion to
consider any fact and research any persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to
assist it in developing Utah jurisprudence as it has done so in this appeal.
Reconsidering the appeal or allowing the State to additionally brief the issue of
"common authority or control" is not likely to result in a change in the outcome of this
Court's decision of August 6, 1998.

1

Now Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the appellants request this Honorable Court to
find no merit in the appellee's Petition for Rehearing. The probation officers lacked
probable cause to search Ms. Hyatt's property. Therefore, its prior decision should be
upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of
October, 1998.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 19th day of October,
1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
REHEARING upon the counsel for the appellee in this matter, by mailing it to him by
first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: Thomas B.
Brunker, Office of the Attorney General, Heber Wells Building, 160 East 300 South,
6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854.

Dated this

19th day of October, 1998.
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POINT I.
THE APPELLATE COURTS ARE FREE TO RULE ON QUESTIONS OF LAW ON
BE NOVO.
In this matter, the appellant claims a violation of due process. The State
believes, mistakenly so, that it was deprived of the opportunity to respond to the issue
of "common authority or control." The State failed to adequately address the issue of
the Davis' control over Hyatt's vehicle. The appellants adequately addressed the issue
absent controlling Utah jurisprudence on the issue to brief more clearly than as
presented by the appellants. Nonetheless, this Court's majority opinion was correct
when it determined that the appellants had adequately raised and preserved the issue.
Just as the Court pointed out, the appellants argued the matter in the trial court,
addressed it in their brief, and argued it again at oral arguments.
The fact that this Court included persuasive authority from other
jurisdictions, when the appellants had not was not an abusive of discretion on questions
of law. These issues were and are reviewable de novo and no particular deference is
accorded to the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of law, however, the
standard of review is not phrased as "clearly erroneous." Rather, appellate
review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the
term "correctness." Controlling Utah case law teaches that "correctness"
means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d
431, 433 (Utah 1993); see, Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d
1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). This is because appellate courts have traditionally been
seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is
uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful
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(Nov. 30, 1992); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 290 (Utah 1989)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State '
v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549,
557 (Utah 1989); In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P,2d 633, 653 (Utah
1988); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result); In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah
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particular determination under review. Based on the foregoing, we
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courts in question, and we see no reason why our authority to define
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explain, in pertinent part:
It is widely agreed that the primary function of a standard of review is to
apportion power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and
appellate courts for determining an issue or class of issues. See, e.g.,
State v. Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 38 (Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1992)
(Jackson, J., concurring); Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 36 (D.C.
1989); Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice on Appeal 130 (1976); Patrick
W. Brennau, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 Def. L.J. 377, 377
(1984); Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review - Looking Beyond the
Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1991) [hereinafter Hofer]; Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 234-35
(1985) [hereinafter Monaghan]. Put another way, a standard of review
allocates discretion between trial and appellate courts. In determining the
appropriateness of a particular allocation of responsibility for deciding an
issue or class of issues, account should be taken of the relative capabilities
of each level of the court system to take evidence and make findings of
fact in the face of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and to set
binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other. See, e.g., Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1985); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d
125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213,
217-18 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195,
1201-02 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Davis,
564 A.2d at 36-37. In short, the choice of the appropriate standard of
review "turns on a determination that, as a matter of the sound
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than
another to decide the issue in question." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552, 559-60 (1988) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114); accord Salve
Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1222 (1991). See generally
Hofer at 237-41.
Id. In other words, the Utah Supreme Court absent an expressed Federal Law limiting
the appellate courts' power are free to govern themselves and rule of Utah matters free
and clear of out-of-state influences. In this matter, this Court acted clearly within this
discretion.
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when filing his opening brief. Because he did not analyze that issue at that time,
we will not review it.
Id. Unlike the circumstance in Brown, the appellants in this matter have not attempted
to rehabilitate an appeal where they have realized that they failed to include any such
state constitutional analysis. However, as pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court, this
is not an absolute, rather it is a discretionary power. The Court in Romrell v. Zions
First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (1980) previously ruled on this issue stating:
For the first time, defendants raise the issue of the trial court's failure to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law in their reply brief. As a general rule, an
issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on appeal since a
reply brief, as stated in Rule 75(p)(2)! "shall be limited to answering any new
matter set forth in respondent's brief . . . ." Nevertheless, the Court, in its
discretion, may decide a case upon any points that its proper disposition may
require, even if first raised in a reply brief.
Id. (Citations omitted, emphasis added). Clearly it is within this Court's discretion to
consider any fact and research any persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to
assist it in developing Utah jurisprudence as it has done so in this appeal.
Reconsidering the appeal or allowing the State to additionally brief the issue of
"common authority or control" is not likely to result in a change in the outcome of this
Court's decision of August 6, 1998.

1

Now Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Based upon (lie I'uregoing. 'Me mpellaiits request this Honorable Court to
find no merit in the appellee's Petition for Re

'

probable cause to search. Ms. Hyatt's prpp^tv

^

m

i probation officers lacked

= _v.^

.u- •

upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of
October,

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants
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U'\ i>i October,

>!•', n| in, foregoing RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR

REHEARING upon the counsel for the appellee in this mutter, by mailing it to him by
first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the n mowing address: Thomas B.
Brunker, Office of tin Auonicy uencr.il, Heher WVIK [<iiililmi.» hm Fast 300 South,
- ' - u Lake Cic\, Utah 84114-0854.

Dated this

19th day of October, 1998.
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